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This paper develops and discusses a Proxy Means Test (PMT) based household targeting system for 
Bangladesh.  The PMT model derived from household survey data includes observable and 
verifiable characteristics on (i) household demographics and characteristics of household head; (ii) 
ownership of assets; (iii) housing quality, and access to facilities and remittances; and (iv) location 
variables in a formal algorithm to proxy household welfare. Simulations of the model suggest that 
the proposed PMT formula is able to improve the targeting efficiency a considerable amount when 
compared to existing targeted safety net programs. However, numerous implementation challenges 
remain which include but are not limited to a cost-efficient data collection process, effective 
management of information and a feasible and cost-efficient monitoring and verification system to 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Despite impressive gains in poverty reduction in recent years, the number of extreme poor in 
Bangladesh still remained at a staggering 35 million in 2005. Chronically underfed and highly 
vulnerable, this segment of the population have little to call their own that would enable them to 
fight hunger during lean seasons, treat debilitating disease and illness, and overcome losses 
associated with regular flooding and other calamities. Further, the sheer size of the population 
living around the poverty line
1 implies that a small shock can push a large number of individuals 
into poverty, and many who are already poor, into extreme poverty. The rise in global prices of 
rice in 2007-08 for instance offset the decrease in the incidence of poverty between 2005 and 




In response to its extreme poverty levels and to mitigate the risk of households falling into (or 
further into) poverty as a result of shocks, Bangladesh implements a wide range of targeted 
safety net programs operated by various government agencies.
3
                                                 
1 As reflected by the distribution of consumption in HIES 2005. See Bangladesh 2008 Poverty Assessment for 
detailed analysis (World Bank 2008b). 
 Nevertheless, the number of 
people covered under these safety net programs represents only 22 percent of households in the 
bottom expenditure quintile and 4 percent of the households in the top expenditure quintile 
(World Bank, 2008b). The low coverage of the target group and the inclusion errors found in 
some programs appear to be in part due to weaknesses in targeting mechanisms. Identification of 
the poor is often faulty as many public safety net programs rely on selection criteria that are 
neither observable nor verifiable (Ahmed, 2007). Targeting the poor in general is very difficult 
not least due to weaknesses in targeting instruments. Implementation details matter enormously 
to distributive outcomes, as is evidenced by the remarkable success of Bangladeshi non-
government organizations (NGOs) and MFIs in their ability to reach the poor with services that 
combine safety net type interventions with microfinance products. Much of their success in 
targeting the poor has to do with their local level presence and knowledge as well as efficient 
management information systems funded by donors (World Bank, 2007). These NGO driven 
2 Ibid. 
3 There are non-government institutions as well that operate many anti-poverty programs such as microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) that act as safety nets that protect the consumption of households especially during shocks. 
Although limited in scale, MFIs have becoming increasingly active in experimenting with a number of initiatives to 
address chronic poverty and vulnerability caused by seasonality.  2 
 
targeting strategies which are often labour-intensive and community based are not always 
possible for large government bureaucracies to adopt let alone implement. Designing an effective 
household targeting system that can serve multiple safety net programs run by the Government, 
especially those that target the extreme poor remains an important part of the discourse on 
vulnerability and poverty reduction in Bangladesh. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to present and discuss a household targeting system for Bangladesh 
that tries to identify the extreme poor based on a formula derived from household survey data. 
Known as Proxy Means Tests, this method of targeting involves using observable and verifiable 
household or individual characteristics in a formal algorithm to proxy household welfare. These 
variables are selected based on their ability to predict welfare as measured by, for instance, 
consumption expenditure of households. Such a system is often preferred for its transparent 
process and objective criteria, cost efficiency and its potential ability to minimize to some extent 
elite capture. The administrative difficulties associated with sophisticated means tests used by 
most public safety net programs in Bangladesh, and the inaccuracy of the results due to the 
problems with measuring income also provide a strong rationale for employing proxy means 
tests. Like means tests, proxy means tests can be costly relative to other forms of household level 
targeting (e.g. community-based targeting methods). However, they tend to produce the lowest 




There is both academic evidence and practical experience that suggest using proxies for 
consumption expenditure can identify the poor with a reasonable level of accuracy. For example, 
Haddad et al (1991) use household level data to show that proxy variables can be used as good 
measures of caloric adequacy rather than using the memory of  individuals which can be 
unreliable in many instances. Other studies use regression analysis to point to a set of variables 
that are able to proxy for welfare levels (Glewwe and Kanaan, 1989; Grosh and Baker, 1995; 
Narayan et al, 2005; Ahmed and Bouis, 2002). There is also encouraging practical experience 
from Latin American countries like Chile which have been using a PMT based targeting system 
since the 1980s, and from other countries such as Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico who have 
                                                 
4 See World Bank (2008) for a comparison of the various types of targeting methods, including categorical and self-
targeting mechanisms. See also Castenada and Lindbert (2005) for a discussion of PMT-based targeting systems 
adopted by some Latin American countries. 3 
 
adopted this targeting system more recently in the late 90s. In all of these cases, the PMT based 
targeting system managed to perform well in terms of targeting incidence outcomes (Castenada 
and Lindert, 2005). For example, between 80-90 percent of the benefits of proxy-means tested 
programs in Chile and Mexico are received by the poorest 40 percent of the households in those 
countries. The efficacy of proxy means testing has also been documented in an earlier 
comparative study which found that among all targeting mechanisms proxy means tests tend to 
produce the best incidence outcomes in developing countries (Grosh, 1994). Proxy means tests 
are known to especially distinguish chronic poverty well (Grosh et al, 2008) which makes it an 
appropriate targeting option in the context of Bangladesh where the depth and severity of poverty 
is relatively high compared to other South Asian countries. 
 
There are however, some drawbacks to using Proxy Means Tests. Since the formula is only a 
prediction, there can be inherent inaccuracies, especially when targeting the poorest of the poor. 
The challenge of targeting the bottom 10 percent of the population essentially stems from the 
fact that it is harder to predict consumption with reasonable accuracy at the left tail of the 
consumption distribution.  For instance, Grosh and Baker (1995) find that proxy means tests 
have significant levels of errors of exclusion when trying to target the bottom 10 to 20 percent of 
the population (even though they do cut down errors of inclusion enough to have a better impact 
on poverty than if no targeting is done). There is also recent evidence from Pakistan that is 
consistent with the above view (Hou, 2008). Such evidence suggests caution when using a PMT-
based household targeting system for safety net programs, and asks that programs be designed in 
such a way so as to minimize these targeting errors. For example, combining the PMT with 
geographic or community level outreach and validation where appropriate and feasible can 
improve accuracy (Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott, 2004). Further, existing international 
experience suggests that PMT based targeting systems take time (at least 18 months) to design, 
pilot and implement on a large scale  (Castaneda and Lindbert, 2005). Having the institutional set 
up to implement the targeting system is just as important as having a robust PMT formula. There 
is a need for example to have an appropriate data collection strategy and adequate management 
systems to ensure (i) the accuracy of household assessment mechanisms and (ii) appropriate 
monitoring and oversight mechanisms to ensure transparency, credibility and control of fraud.  
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This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the paper summarizes the challenges 
public safety net programs in Bangladesh face as they pertain to the targeting of poor 
households. Section three explains proxy means testing and how it is implemented to determine 
program eligibility. Using the latest Bangladesh Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
(HIES) 2005, section four goes on to discuss the various steps taken to derive the Proxy Means 
Tests Formula (PMTF) for Bangladesh. Discussions regarding the various checks and balances 
undertaken to identify the best possible PMTF as well as recommendations on the choice of the 
cut-off line when determining household eligibility status are included in this section. 
Comparisons between the targeting accuracy of the PMT model and existing programs are also 
discussed. In section five, we present some of the implementation challenges associated with 
using a PMT-based targeting system in the Bangladeshi context. The paper concludes in section 
six. 
 
2.  Public Safety Net Programs in Bangladesh 
 
The Bangladesh government currently implements a wide range of safety net programs targeted 
to the poor including both cash and in kind (or food) programs. The broad categories of safety 
net programs include: (i) infrastructure-building programs that are essentially self-targeted 
workfare programs; (ii) training programs on income generating activities and awareness 
building regarding health, nutrition and legal rights; (iii) education programs that deliver food 
conditional on children’s education at both primary and secondary levels; (iv) relief programs 
that are designed to mitigate the consequences of disasters; and (v) programs for disadvantaged 
groups like the elderly, the widowed, the disabled, and freedom fighters. The larger programs 
include the Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) program which has the highest coverage, followed 
by Old Age Pension, Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) and Test Relief (TR) programs. 
The administrative structure and the implementation mechanisms of some of these safety net 
programs have gone through substantive changes over the last thirty years - from being mostly 
relief oriented to ones with a much more focus on poverty reduction and employment generation. 
For example, food price subsidies were replaced by targeted food distribution. Partnerships with 
NGOs were forged to implement various training and microfinance programs. The government 
has shown remarkable willingness to evaluate program effectiveness, confront shortcomings and 5 
 
cancel or modify programs to improve performance. For example, the high costs and levels of 
leakage found in the Palli rationing program influenced the government to abolish and replace it 
with an innovative Food for Education (FFE) program in 1993. Moreover, there has also been a 
gradual shift from food to cash based programs, given the high leakage associated with the 
former. For example, the Food-for-Education program was transformed into a cash-based stipend 
program, and Cash-For-Work is gradually replacing the Food-For-Work (FFW) program. The 
willingness and the ability to reform safety net programs thus represent a dynamic aspect of 
safety net policy in Bangladesh. 
 
The number of people covered by public safety net programs however, represents only a fraction 
of the poor. About 22 percent of households in the lowest consumption quintile receive benefits 
from safety net programs. As shown in Table 1, even among the bottom 10 percent of the 
population, the combined coverage of all safety net programs is just 23 percent, and for targeted 
programs it is only 16 percent. There is also an urban-rural imbalance in terms of safety net 
coverage: 15 percent of rural households report being a member of at least one safety net 
program compared to only 5 percent among urban households (Ahmed, 2007).   
 
While the overall coverage is pro-poor, a 
sizeable number of non-poor households 
also receive benefits.  Table 2 shows that 
the percent of households who benefit 
from targeted programs decline 
progressively for higher quintiles.  While 
such progressive incidence of coverage is 
a positive feature, a strong area of concern 
is the considerable level of inclusion errors 
across programs. For example, 48 percent 
of beneficiaries of old age pensions are in the top three quintiles compared with 39 percent of 
TR, VGF and VGD beneficiaries. Further, 41 percent of the beneficiaries of all targeted 
programs are in the top three quintiles. Among the beneficiaries of all non-targeted 
Table 1: Coverage of households participating 
in at least one safety net program (%) 
Quintiles  Non-
Targeted  Targeted  Pension  Total 
Lowest  2.3  15.7  3.6  21.6 
2
nd   2.7  10.6  2.2  15.4 
3
rd   3.3  7.9  2.2  13.4 
4
th   2.3  5.3  2.2  9.8 
5
th    1.6  2.2  0.6  4.4 
Total  2.4  8.1  2.1  12.6 
Bottom 
10%  2.4  16.0  4.6  23.1 
Source: HIES 2005 in Ahmed (2007)  6 
 
programs, 45 percent are among the top three quintiles. This suggests that targeted safety net 
programs do not achieve much efficiency gains over untargeted programs (see Table 2).  
Table 2: Incidence of Targeting by Per Capita Consumption Quintiles   











VGD   31.7  29.1  19.4  14.3  5.5 
TR  38.9  22.2  18.9  13.3  6.7 
VGF  36.1  25.0  20.7  13.0  5.2 
Old Age Pension  31.9  20.0  21.1  20.5  6.5 
Total (targeted)  34.2  24.6  20.0  15.2  6.0 
Total (non-targeted)  30.9  23.8  21.6  16.2  7.5 
Source: HIES 2005 in Ahmed, 2007. 
 
The low coverage of the target group and relatively high errors of inclusion of certain programs 
appear to be in part due to weaknesses in targeting mechanisms.  First, program allocations do 
not take into account the geographic variation in poverty rates across the country
5
                                                 
5 For example, Sylhet has a poverty rate much lower than the national rate but nevertheless has the highest coverage 
of safety nets among all divisions.  In contrast Khulna, which has the second-highest poverty rate in the country, has 
the least coverage of safety nets (Ahmed, 2007). 
. Instead, the 
general targeting strategy involves an initial guideline prepared by the implementing ministry, 
which sets the targeting criteria at the household level, the total number of beneficiaries, the type 
of beneficiaries (including caps on male and female beneficiaries) per union, and the amount of 
transfer per beneficiary.  Second, similar programs use different criteria for targeting benefits, 
and these are not applied universally.  For example, programs such as VGD, VGF and Old Age 
Allowance target similar low income groups but use different criteria to identify beneficiaries.  
Beneficiary surveys show that selected individuals rarely fulfill all the criteria for a specific 
program (Ahmed, 2005). A number of indicators used to select beneficiaries are difficult if not 
impossible to observe and verify. For example, means testing is widely known to be problematic 
since income (used by most programs) is difficult to measure and verify as is the indicator 
“members consume less than two full meals a day” (a VGD criterion) (Ahmed et al, 2007). 
Third, the total amount of transfers often does not reach beneficiaries. According to Ahmed 
(2005) multiple and ineffective targeting systems, combined with the large number of 
intermediaries particularly in the food-based safety net programs, increase leakage in the 7 
 
programs in terms of reduced amount of benefits. IFRI estimates that the leakage of transfers at 
the beneficiary level can range between 2 and 13.6 percent (Ahmed et al, 2003).  
 
Poor program implementation, monitoring and evaluation are likely to cause some transfers to 
leak to non poor beneficiaries as well.  Programs are often administered by multiple ministries 
despite having considerable overlap with little monitoring of benefit allocations (Ahmed, 2007). 
The lack of an overall coordinating authority constrains the development of a coherent approach 
to the implementation of targeted programs and the efficient allocation of public re-distributive 
expenditures. Thus there are potential cost-saving benefits to implementing a PMT-based 
targeting approach:  the system can be used by several programs for different target groups, and 
thus can maximize the return on fixed overhead costs associated with initial investments. The 
systematic use of information via a PMT-based targeting system not only  improves the 
administrative capacity of programs, but it also simplifies the monitoring and the verification of 
claims and payment systems. Implementing such a targeting mechanism as part of an effort to 
improve the overall safety net system in Bangladesh  thus appears to be a reasonable step 
forward.  
 
3.  Determining Eligibility and Targeting Accuracy using a PMTF 
 
Developing a proxy means test formula (PMTF) involves finding a weighted combination of 
“proxy” variables or indicators that together identify or predict whether a household is poor or 
not. The data this paper uses to identify an appropriate set of variables and weights is the latest 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) of 2005 conducted by the Government of 
Bangladesh. Used for the latest calculations on the incidence of poverty in Bangladesh, the HIES 
2005 is well-suited for the purposes of this exercise as it contains rich and detailed information 
on most correlates of welfare. On the downside, it only includes community level information for 
rural areas, thereby limiting us to only household level proxies when predicting welfare in urban 
areas.  The HIES 2005 was conducted more than three years ago, and thus in our analysis we 8 
 
avoid variables that even though are highly correlated to poverty are also likely to rapidly change 




For the purposes of this exercise welfare is proxied by monthly per capita household 
consumption expenditure. The PMTF assigns a “score” to every household, based on information 
collected from the household for all variables that are included in the formula. All scores are 
derived from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of (log of) per capita consumption 
expenditure on a set of variables. OLS is generally used to predict welfare mainly due to the 
convenience and ease of interpretation. For instance, the weight for each variable is its 
coefficient in the regression, rounded to the nearest integer. The aggregate score for each 
household is calculated as the constant plus or minus the weight on each variable, and reflects 
predicted expenditure or welfare: the lower the score, the poorer the household.  
 
The weights on these variables are then used to identify those who will be eligible to receive 




th percentile). A household is considered poor 
and thus eligible to participate in a program if its predicted expenditure (or the PMT score) is 
less than the chosen cut off line, also known as the targeting line. Policy makers generally 
determine this cut off line such that the maximum number of the poorest households is served 
given the available budget. The choice of the cut-off line is also crucial in determining the level 
of targeting errors. Since prediction by any model is never exact, we expect that some poor will 
be incorrectly identified as nonpoor, and some nonpoor will be incorrectly identified as poor. 
Those whose “true” and predicted consumption levels fall below the cut-off line are targeting 
successes. Similarly those who should not and do not get the transfers are also targeting 
successes. However, when “true” and predicted consumption levels fall on different sides of the 
eligibility cut-off line, a targeting error occurs. A person whose “true” consumption is below the 
cut-off but whose predicted consumption falls above the cut-off, this person is wrongly identified 
                                                 
6 Even though multivariate regressions show that owning a mobile is positively correlated with consumption, we 
exclude it from the PMTF for the following two reasons: (i) the use of mobile has seen a drastic increase since 2005, 
and thus using this variable as reported by HIES 2005 may be misleading; and (ii) the coefficient on this variable is 
substantially larger when compared to the other asset variables, and thus an erroneous entry in the PMT form 
regarding  ownership of a mobile phone will have a larger effect on the probability of being eligible than in the case 
of any other asset variables.  9 
 
as “ineligible.” This kind of error is called an error of exclusion. Dividing the exclusion error by 
the total number of households who should get benefits gives us the percentage of those whom 
the program is meant to cover but who are not covered, otherwise known as “undercoverage.” 
This undercoverage negatively affects the ability of the program to impact the welfare of some 
poor people but it carries no budgetary costs.  
 
The other type of error occurs when a household’s “true” consumption level is above the cut-off 
line but its predicted welfare is below it. These households are incorrectly identified as eligible 
and they constitute an error of inclusion. The percentage of benefits that are received by these 
ineligible households is known as the “leakage.” Thus lower levels of undercoverage and leakage 
are preferable to higher ones. Which of the two targeting performance indicators is given priority 
over the other is essentially a policy decision. The higher the priority assigned to lowering 
poverty, the greater should be the importance placed on minimizing undercoverage. Whereas, the 
higher the priority assigned to savings associated with limited budgets, the more important it will 
be to minimize leakage. Given that for developing countries, both undercoverage and leakage are 
important considerations, an appropriate PMT model would be one that to the extent possible 
minimizes both. Thus, when devising the PMT formula, one needs to test a number of cut-off 
lines to identify the cut-off line that gives the best targeting outcomes.  
 
The coverage rate or the sum of the total beneficiaries as a proportion of the total population, will 
also vary with the eligibility cut-off line but is not necessarily equal to the eligibility cut-off line. 
For instance, even though the cut off line is set at the 30
th percentile, the model may target less 
than 30 percent of the population on the aggregate. This is because the 30
th percentile in terms of 
actual consumption is not equal to the 30
th percentile in terms of predicted consumption. Thus 
the choice of the cut-off line could also depend on the size of the population expected to be 
targeted as determined by the size of the benefit and the total budget available for programs. 
Table A1 in the Annex explains these concepts in greater detail.  
 
The targeting efficiency of the PMTF depends on these following four key features. First, the 
variables chosen to estimate the model should be very good predictors of consumption (so that a 
substantial proportion of the variation in consumption is explained by the regression model). 10 
 
Second, the proxies used should be relatively few but easy to measure and verify. Third, the 
model should achieve a reasonable level of targeting accuracy such that undercoverage, leakage 
and coverage rates associated with the model are at acceptable levels. Fourth, the incidence of 
beneficiaries should be acceptable, i.e. the PMT should be able to rank selected beneficiaries 
mostly in the bottom end of the consumption distribution. While we would like the model to 
cover all of those who fall below the poverty line, the error is less grave if the households who 
are excluded fall only just below the poverty line rather than at the very bottom of the 
consumption distribution. Similarly, out of those households who are included by the model, it is 
preferred that a higher proportion of the identified beneficiaries belong to the bottom section of 
the consumption distribution. The next section explains the various steps and approaches 
undertaken to arrive at a Proxy Means Test Formula (PMTF) using HIES 2005, and evaluates the 
targeting efficiency of this proposed PMTF. 
 
4.  A Proxy Means Testing Formula for Bangladesh  
 
4.1 Selecting a PMT model 
The dependent variable of the PMT  model - the natural log of per capita household consumption 
-  represents the sum of food and non-food expenditures (excluding durable goods) and is 
adjusted for spatial price differences using the upper poverty line, as reported in the 2008 
Bangladesh Poverty Assessment (World Bank, 2008b). The proxy variables entered in the formal 
algorithm are chosen primarily from the determinants of poverty as identified in the Bangladesh 
2008 Poverty Assessment. The final choice of variables was made based on the following: (i) 
that they are easily observable and measurable; (ii) that they cannot be manipulated easily by 
households; and (iii) that they are not politically sensitive. There are often trade-offs when 
choosing variables based on these criteria and in the end a pilot testing of the variables on the 
ground is preferable to ensure that the final choice of the model is robust. The variables that have 
been found to be highly correlated with poverty in Bangladesh and are included in this exercise 
fall broadly into four categories: (1) household demographics and characteristics of household 
head; (2) ownership of easily verifiable assets; (3) housing quality, access to facilities and 
remittances, and participation in anti-poverty programs; and (4) location variables.  
 11 
 
 (1) Household demographics and characteristics of household head: As is the case in many 
countries, multivariate regressions suggest that the number of infants, children and adults were 
negatively correlated with per capita expenditures in 2005. This negative association is much 
stronger with number of infants or children than that of adults – as additional child (age 1 to 14) 
in the household is associated with around 18 percent lower per capita household expenditures. 
This negative association is even stronger for infants of age less than one year. These results are 
consistent with the fact that the dependency ratio is higher in poor households than in non-poor 
households in Bangladesh (ibid).  
 
The Poverty Assessment also suggests a negative correlation between household size and 
poverty. This result holds even after adjustments for economies of scale and equivalence scales 
in consumption. Both religion and age of the household head also affect the economic status of 
households. Non-muslim household heads tend to be poorer while household per capita 
expenditure increases with the age of the household head, the effect declining with increasing 
age. However, due to the sensitivity of religion in the context of Bangladesh, we do not include 
the religion of the household head in the formula for the PMT.  
 
To capture the associations between poverty and gender we take our cue from the Poverty 
Assessment in that instead of using the gender of the household head, we use information on the 
marital status of female headed households. Given that many female-headed households in rural 
areas receive remittances from male members, the Poverty Assessment finds that the correlation 
between the gender of the household head and household economic status is affected by how one 
distinguishes between de facto and de jure female headed households. The data suggests that 
female headed households are likely to be poorer when the head is widowed, divorced or 
separated, i.e., they are less likely to have an adult male in the household.  
 
Education is a key determinant of poverty as shown by multivariate regressions that tests the 
impact of the education level of the household head on per capita household expenditure. The 
education premiums are even higher when the head has an education level of tenth grade or 
higher. The education of the spouse of the household head has a similar impact on poverty, 
though smaller in magnitude compared to equivalent levels of education of the household head. 12 
 
Given that Bangladeshi girls and women continue to make considerable progress in terms of 
school enrollments and increased levels of participation in economic activities respectively, the 
education of the spouse is be an important variable to include in the PMTF. Occupational status 
of household members is also associated with household poverty in Bangladesh. Nearly a third 
of total employment is in the daily wage sector where poverty rate among households when the 
household head works as a agricultural daily wage labourer is 72 percent compared to 60 percent 
when the head works as non-agricultural daily wage labourer.  
 
(2) Ownership of easily verifiable assets: Ownership of assets is typically associated with 
poverty. Accordingly, the Bangladesh Poverty Assessment finds that ownership of land is highly 
correlated with household poverty. Poverty rate for the landless (less than 0.05 acres of land) was 
57 percent in 2005 compared to 24 percent for small landowners (1.5 to 2.5 acres of land), and 
13 percent for medium/large landowners (2.5 acres or more). Multivariate regressions show that 
ownership of land raises household per capita consumption progressively with land size for rural 
households. Urban households face a similar situation though the effects are relatively smaller 
and are significant for land size of 0.5 acres and above – reflecting the lower importance of land 
for livelihoods in urban areas. Other important household assets owned by the poor include 
livestock ownership, especially in rural areas. Between 2000 and 2005, the average livestock 
asset value in real terms increased by about 20 for all households, and for poorer households 
(e.g. bottom five deciles) the increase was almost 50 percent. This increase appears to have come 
from both households increasing their existing stock and from a higher number of households 
owning livestock. For the PMTF, we test additional household assets in our OLS regression to 
assess their correlations with household poverty. These assets include house, TV, tube well, fan, 
and bicycle. 
 
(3)  Housing quality, access to facilities, remittances and participation in anti-poverty 
programs: The Bangladesh Poverty Assessment points to a range of characteristics that are also 
correlated with consumption. These include better quality houses, built with superior materials 
and equipped with electricity and access to clean drinking water and hygienic sanitation 13 
 




The Poverty Assessment does find that over the period 2000 and 2005, housing conditions 
improved dramatically with a larger percentage of households with walls and roofs of corrugated 
iron sheets and cement, materials that are more resilient to adverse weather conditions 
(Serajuddin et al, 2007).  
The Poverty Assessment also highlights the growing importance of the role of both domestic and 
foreign remittances as a key driver of poverty reduction in Bangladesh: access to remittances is 
highly correlated with household expenditure in both urban and rural areas. The data shows that 
while the incidence of domestic remittances has increased by 12 percent between 2000 and 2005, 
suggesting increased internal migration, the correlation of household consumption with foreign 
remittances is nearly three times larger than that with domestic remittances. There is a caveat 
however, that international migration often requires large up-front costs which are not factored 
into these regressions. Despite such large costs, many existing studies suggest that even the poor 
are able to gain from overseas employment (Siddiqui and Abrar, 2003).
8
 
 The variable “whether 
the household receives domestic remittances” however is dropped from the PMT model since it 
may be problematic to verify at any one point in time since many members of poor households 
are temporary migration workers.   
The link between microfinance and poverty is also an important consideration as pointed out by 
the Poverty Assessment. Although the lack of data does not allow for a rigorous assessment of 
the role of microfinance in poverty reduction, there is some evidence that suggests that 
expansion in the membership in microfinance programs at the Thana  level and household 
consumption levels are found to be positively correlated. The HIES 2005 does not provide any 
information on household membership in microfinance programs, but does provide data on 
household membership in safety net programs – some of which offer microcredit. Although this 
variable is not a precise measure we explore its impact in the PMTF and find that it is a 
significant determinant of household per capita consumption. However we decide to drop the 
variable from the final model for a practical reason: the variable cannot be used for 
                                                 
7 In fact earlier work on poverty in Bangladesh found the quality of housing to be correlated with poverty. Hossain 
(1995) finds that households who live in houses with straw roofs are typically extremely poor.  
8 See Bangladesh Poverty Assessment for further details.  14 
 
recertification of eligibility status over time after the first time that an applicant fills up the PMT 
form. 
 
(4) Location variables: The Poverty Assessment shows that the incidence of poverty has a clear 
regional pattern in Bangladesh which suggests that the geographical location of a household 
plays an important role in determining its consumption levels. Detailed analysis of this pattern 
suggests that significant consumption gains among the poor were largely limited to the eastern 
part of the country that has better access to major urban growth centers of the country. The east 
includes the Dhaka, Chittagong and Sylhet divisions while in the west the lagging regions 
include the Khulna, Rajshahi and Barisal divisions. All of the Eastern districts had significant 
reductions in poverty, a phenomenon that has been explained by spillover effects from the Dhaka 
district – which has had historically the lowest poverty incidence – on other surrounding areas. In 
contrast, some of the areas in the West have actually grown poorer whiles others have stagnated 
(see Table 3 below).   
 
The need to include location variables in the PMTF is also important from the view to improve 
existing regional coverage of safety net program. Table 3 shows that the coverage of safety net 
programs varies significantly by division and is not well correlated with divisional level poverty 
rates. For example, Sylhet has a poverty rate much lower than the national rate but nevertheless 
has the highest coverage of safety nets among all divisions. In contrast Khulna, which has the 
second-highest poverty rate in the country, has the least coverage of safety nets. Low coverage 
among the total population of the relatively poorer districts also translates to low coverage 
among the poorest. Around 41 and 28 percent of households from the poorest decile participate 
in safety net programs in Sylhet and Chittagong respectively, compared to 15 percent in Barisal 
and Khulna (Ahmed, 2007).  
 
Table 3: Poverty Headcount and the Distribution of Safety Net Beneficiary Households (%) 
Division 
Poverty Headcount  Distribution of Beneficiary Households 
2000  2005 
2005  2005  2005 
Total  Rural  Urban 
Dhaka  46.7  32.0  14.27  19.98  4.94 
Barisal  53.1  52.0  13.34  14.79  5.00 
Chittagong  45.7  34.0  11.06  12.89  5.72 15 
 
Khulna  45.1  45.7  9.58  11.03  4.23 
Rajshahi  56.7  51.2  12.07  13.02  6.71 
Sylhet  42.4  33.8  22.42  24.31  11.25 
National  48.9  40.0  13.02  15.54  5.45 
Source: HIES 2000 and 2005 in Ahmed, 2007 
 
These four categories of variables identified from the Poverty Assessment are included in a basic 
model as a first step to develop the PMTF. Most of the continuous variables however, were 
converted to dummy variables to allow for a flexible form for the regression. Continuous 
variables are also more likely to be mis-reported at the right tail. Different subsets of variables 
are then checked for possible multicollinearity and adjustments are made accordingly. Multiple 
models are then generated that are then evaluated based on their respective levels of coverage, 
undercoverage and leakage rates to decide on the final model used to arrive at the PMTF. The 
optimal model is selected based on the overall effectiveness in prediction and the undercoverage, 
leakage, and coverage rates, and the incidence of targeting.  Table A2 in Annex reports the first 
three performance indicators for cut-off lines ranging from the 15
th  percentile to the 40
th 
percentile. These cut-off lines are chosen given the latest 2005 poverty calculations that show 
that the extreme poverty line in Bangladesh ranged from 14.6 percent in urban areas to 28.6 
percent in rural areas in 2005. The national extreme or “lower” poverty line is estimated to be 
25.1 percent, whereas the “upper” poverty line is at 40 percent. Regression results for the 
proposed PMT model are presented in Table A3.  
 
Some countries (e.g. Jamaica) use different PMT models for urban and rural areas due to 
differing “manifestations” of poverty in these respective areas. Theoretically this is ideal since it 
offers the best model for each areas allowing for structural differences, and thus would naturally 
minimize the respective error rates. However, from a practical standpoint using two separate 
models for urban and rural areas respectively has administrative cost implications as well as 
operational complications such as the ambiguity of distinction between rural and urban in some 
areas in Bangladesh. The ultimate decision should be based on further analysis of the PMT 
model’s predictive power by urban and rural areas, and a subsequent assessment of targeting 
performance.  However, calibrating two regressions for rural and urban areas separately even 
with a larger set of variables fails to result in any substantial improvement in the targeting 
accuracy when compared with the errors associated with the national model conditioned by 16 
 
urban and rural status (See Figures A1 and A2 in Annex). Given these results we recommend 
using one national PMT model.  
 
The proposed PMTF is more likely to assign benefits to larger households; households who own 
fewer durable goods and less land, live in poor quality housing; households with younger or 
older household heads who are less educated; and where the head is a female or who is either 
widowed, separated or divorced, and has lower levels of education. These variables are generally 
associated with low welfare as evidenced by the 2008 Bangladesh Poverty Assessment (World 
Bank, 2008). The weight on each variable is also consistent with the results of the 2008 Poverty 
Assessment. Table 4A in the Annex presents the weights on each variable for the PMT model. 
Table 4B explains how eligibility is determined based on the PMT scores using a number of 
eligibility cut-off lines or various percentiles of the actual per capita consumption distribution. 
Given the characteristics of the households and the respective weights on each of their 
characteristics, household A receives a score of 616 while household B receives a score of 716. 
Using a cut-off line of either the 15
th or the 40
th percentile, and comparing with the relevant cut-
off score, we find the household A and not B is eligible.  
 
4.2.  Comparing the proposed PMTF with models developed in other countries 
A comparison of the regression models used for proxy means testing in other countries indicates 
that our model performs quite well in terms of predicting household welfare  and  targeting 
accuracy. For example, Narayan et al (2005) achieved R
2=0.56 in the case of Sri Lanka while the 
predictive power of the model used in Pakistan was 0.53 (Hou, 2007). Proxy means test models 
developed elsewhere had a much lower R
2: Glinskaya and Grosh (1997) achieved R
2= 0.20 in 
Armenia while Gorsh and Baker (1995) achieved R
2=0.30 to 0.40 in Latin American countries, 
Ahmed and Bouis (2002) used a model with R
2= 0.43 in the case of Egypt. In terms of targeting 
accuracy, at the 30
th percentile cut-off line, the proposed PMT model generates an undercoverage 
rate of 43 percent and a leakage rate of 30 percent. Recent work on Pakistan by Hou (2008) 
identifies a PMTF that at the same cut-off line results in undercoverage and leakage rates of 48 
and 35 percent respectively. In the case of Sri Lanka (Narayan et al, 2005) for a cut-off of 30
th 
percentile, the PMTF yields an undercoverage rate of 43 and a leakage rate of 35 percent. In 
terms of some of the other countries that currently use a PMT-based targeting system, we find 17 
 
that Jamaica utilizes a model that for the 30
th percentile cut-off, yields an undercoverage rate of 
69 percent and a leakage rate of 44 percent (Grosh and Baker, 1995). The corresponding rates are 
39 percent and 24 percent for urban Bolivia, 54 and 35 percent for urban Peru (Castenada and 
Lindert, 2005). Thus the targeting accuracy of the PMT model presented in this paper for 
Bangladesh compares well with those from other countries, both in South Asia and beyond. The 
variables included in the proposed PMT model for Bangladesh are also similar to the ones used 
by other models in South Asia. Common variables include location, housing quality, ownership 
of durables, family demographics, and characteristics of household head. Table A5 in the annex 
compares the variables used for PMTs in Sri Lanka and Pakistan with those proposed for 
Bangladesh.  
 
4.3  Robustness check for undercoverage and leakage rates 
Since the same sample is used for modeling and testing – which can cause the so-called “over-
fitting” problem – the result may bias in favour of the model because the prediction from the 
model is tested on the same observations that were used to derive coefficients. To check for this, 
the sample is split randomly at the mauza (or PSU) level where half of the households are 
assigned to the modeling sample and the other half to the testing sample. This method has been 
applied in a number of other papers (Grosh and Glinskaya, 1997; Hentschel et al, 1998; Hou, 
2008). We do this for the PMT model, and find that there are no significant differences between 
the two samples for all the variables used. Table A6 shows that error rates using split samples are 
similar to those in the original model for the various cut-off lines. The results suggest that 
estimations using the whole sample are quite robust.  
 
4.4  Evaluating the targeting efficiency of the proposed PMTF 
There are important questions regarding implementation that need to be asked when evaluating 
the PMTF. Since both undercoverage and leakage rates fall as the cut-off line or the threshold 
that defines the target group is increased, it is important to consider which cut-off line to choose 
that generates a reasonable level of targeting accuracy and is also fiscally feasible. The latter will 
depend on the population covered. Other questions to consider include who is wrongfully missed 
and who is wrongfully included? Are these errors consistent across the country or is the targeting 
efficiency better in some areas than others? Finally, if possible it is also important to address 18 
 
how the new selection criteria as proposed by the PMTF compare with existing programs in 
terms of their targeting efficiency in identifying the poor.  
 
4.4.1  Error and coverage rates by divisions and urban/rural status 
Simulations using the proposed PMT model across the various divisions and sectors in the 
country show that there are some caveats to the model  that are noteworthy. In the Dhaka 
division, the undercoverage rate is much higher compared to the rest of the country. At the 30
th 
percentile cut-off, the undercoverage rate in Dhaka division is 62 percent (Table A7) whereas the 
country average is 43 percent.  In contrast undercoverage is much below the country average for 
Rajshahi (31 percent) and Khulna (36 percent) divisions which are substantially poorer than 
Dhaka. Using a higher cut-off of 40
th percentile while reduces the undercoverage rate to 46 
percent in Dhaka, it also significantly lowers the same in the rest of the divisions to as low as 21 
percent in Rajshahi. The variations in the error rates across divisions are also reflected in the 
wide range found in the coverage rates: using a 30
th percentile cut off, the sum of the total 
beneficiaries as a proportion of the total population covered in Dhaka is at a minimum of 13.5 
percent while the same is 39 percent in Barisal. Thus the variations in the targeting efficiency of 
the proposed PMTF across different divisions allow for the possibility of using different cut-off 
lines across different divisions if achieving spatial equality across divisions in terms of the size 
of the beneficiary population is an important policy consideration.  
 
The undercoverage (coverage) rate in urban areas is also considerably higher (lower) than in 
rural areas. The gap between rural and urban leakage rates however is much smaller. The 
problem of undercoverage in urban areas perhaps is less important than it appears. The urban 
sector constitutes 25 percent of the total population, and has a lower incidence of extreme 
poverty (15 percent) than the rural sector (28.6 percent). This implies that a lower number of 
extreme poor in the urban sector are actually left out by the PMTF. A similar argument could be 
made in the case of Sylhet (and Chittagong) with only about 6 (19) percent of the population and 
an incidence of extreme poverty of about 20.8 (16) percent. However, about 60 percent of the 
poorest households in the country are located in Barisal, Khulna and Rajshahi divisions where 
the PMT model performs better than the national average in terms of generating  lower 
undercoverage and leakage rates.  19 
 
 
It  will be important to explore options to minimize errors in the urban areas of the Dhaka 
division where over 30 percent of the population resides, and where the incidence of extreme 
poverty is 19.9 percent. As we find in Table A7, the undercoverage rate is much higher in urban 
areas of Dhaka (which would include Dhaka metropolitan city) than in rural areas of Dhaka. The 
differences in the leakage rates however are minimal. But the undercoverage and leakage rates in 
urban and rural areas of Dhaka are relatively higher than the national levels respectively. To 
explore this point even further, we compare the targeting accuracy between the urban (rural) 
Dhaka with the urban (rural) areas in the rest of the country. We find that the performance in 
both rural and urban Dhaka is still significantly poorer compared to the rural and urban areas of 
the rest of the country respectively. For instance, using a 25
th percentile cut-off, we find the 
undercoverage rate for urban Dhaka is 79 percent compared to 53 percent in the rest of the urban 
areas of the country. The undercoverage rate for rural Dhaka using the same cut-off line is 65 
percent compared to 41 percent in the rest of the rural areas of the country. Targeting the bottom 
25 percent of the population results in the total coverage of beneficiaries as a proportion of the 
population of about 4 percent in urban areas of Dhaka compared to 14 percent in the rest of the 
urban areas in the country. Similarly, for the same target group, the coverage rate is 13 percent in 
rural Dhaka compared to 26 percent in the rest of the country. These results indicate certain 
peculiarities associated with the Dhaka division that is perhaps not captured well by a national 
level PMT model.  
 
One option would be to have a separate PMTF for Dhaka only. However, such a policy would be 
politically impractical and pose administrative complications. An alternative option would be to 
use a higher eligibility cut-off line in the Dhaka division to circumvent this problem of low 
coverage rate. This appears to be possible even with a budgetary limit on resources or a 
requirement of spatial equality of coverage across the country. For example, as we see in Table 
A7, with an eligibility cut-off of 20
th percentile, the model is able to cover around 6.6 percent of 
the population in Dhaka while 17 percent in the rest of the country. The undercoverage and 
leakage rates in Dhaka at the 20
th  percentile cut-off are 75 and 42 percent respectively, as 
compared to 53 and 38 percent in the rest of the country respectively. Using a higher cut-off of 
30
th percentile the model is able to increase the coverage rates in Dhaka to 13 percent while 20 
 
lowering the errors associated with undercoverage and leakage to 62 and 33 percent respectively. 
This results in a substantial reduction in the gap in coverage and error rates between Dhaka and 
the rest of the country. This also means a total coverage of 28 percent of the population in the 
rest of the country which may be fiscally difficult to accommodate. Thus, policy makers would 
need to weigh the political trade-offs between (a) using the same cut-off line nationally; (b) using 
a different cut-off for specific areas such as the Dhaka division and a separate one for the rest of 
the country; and (c) plausible budgetary allocations which will determine coverage and benefit 
levels.
9 If option b is not politically feasible, a possible compromise would be to use the 20
th 
percentile cut-off nationally which is intuitively appealing as it represents the population that 
reside below the national extreme poverty line. This would result in a total national coverage of 
17 percent of the population, and tolerable levels of undercoverage rate of 52 percent and a 
leakage rate of 38 percent. In the Dhaka division, a 20
th percentile cut-off will allow 6 percent of 





4.4.2  Incidence of targeting and distribution of errors 
Due to the relatively high rate of undercoverage generated by the PMT model at the 20
th 
percentile cut-off line, it is important to explore which type of households are actually selected as 
eligible and who are missed, and where they belong on the expenditure distribution. The problem 
of undercoverage is less of a concern if (i) most of the selected households are located in the 
bottom part of the expenditure distribution, (ii) those target groups who are erroneously excluded 
fall just below the cut-off or poverty line, and (iii) those non-target groups who are erroneously 
included fall just above the poverty line. Table A8 shows that the incidence of coverage across 
the distribution of actual per capita consumption expenditure, i.e. how the selected beneficiary 
population is distributed among various groups when the cut-off line is set at the 20
th percentile. 
The model shows highly progressive targeting: depending on which area is chosen, up to one 
                                                 
9 It is important to note that these figures provide us only an indication of the fiscal costs that may be associated when 
targeting a certain portion of the population in various parts of the country. The exact amount of the costs will depend 
on the budget constraint and the size of the benefits levels or the type of payment scheme implemented. 
10 Note that the model covers less than the target population. This is because 20th percentile in actual consumption 
expenditure is not equal to the 20th percentile in terms of predicted expenditure. For example, the model predicts 
expenditure such that only 13 percent of the population has predicted expenditure less than the true expenditure of the 
20th percentile of the population. 21 
 
percent of the richest quintile is identified as eligible beneficiaries whilst over half to more than 
two-thirds of those in the bottom quintile are identified as eligible.  
 
Figure A3 in the Annex shows the incidence of targeting by per capita expenditure decile is also 
progressive. Given the 20th percentile cut-off line, about 36% of beneficiaries are from below 
the bottom 10 percentile and about 23% of beneficiaries are between 10
th percentile and 20
th 
percentile. This is a marked improvement over the incidence of targeting found in many of the 
public safety net programs (see Table 2). 
 
In Table A9 we check the distribution of the exclusion and inclusion errors for the 20
th percentile 
cut-off nationally, by urban/rural status, and in the Dhaka division. In all three cases, the largest 
proportion of eligible households or the target group who are erroneously missed by the model 
belong to the group close to the cut-off lines, followed by households in the lower deciles. At the 
20
th percentile cut-off, 58.65 percent of the target group erroneously missed belonged to the 
second decile while 41.35 percent belonged to the bottom decile (see Figure A3). In the terms of 
the undeserving households or the non-target group that are erroneously included by the model, 
we find that a higher proportion of this group is located just above the cut-off lines. The 
proportion declines monotonically with higher deciles. More than two-thirds of the non-target 
population predicted by the model as eligible belongs to the two deciles just above the cut-off 
lines. Similar distributions of the errors are found for Dhaka as well as in both rural and urban 
areas. 
 
4.4.3  Comparing the PMT model with existing programs 
The targeting efficiency of the proposed PMT model compare quite favourably with the 
performance of safety net programs currently  found in Bangladesh. A  more or less fair 
comparison between the PMT model and the current safety nets in place can be conducted for a 
cut-off at the 20
th percentile of the actual per capita consumption expenditure. This is possible 
since the combined coverage of the total population by all safety net programs is approximately 
12.6 (see Table 1). Using the PMT model with a cut-off of 20
th percentile, a similar coverage rate 
of 13.5 percent of the population can be achieved. When the 20
th percentile cutoff is chosen, the 
PMT model is able to select 52 percent of the beneficiaries from the bottom 10 percent of the 22 
 
population (see Table A8) compared to only 23 percent in the case of current safety net programs 
(Table 1). The incidence of targeting is also much more progressive than that found among the 
largest safety nets programs, VGF, VGD and Old Age Pension programs (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Comparing PMT model and all existing programs: Incidence of targeting by Per 
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Source: HIES 2005 and simulations. 
 
Further, when we compare the targeting accuracy we find that both the undercoverage and 
leakage rates of the PMT model are substantially lower than those of the current programs 
combined  (see Figure 2). The difference in the undercoverage rate is around 20 percentage 
points, and in the leakage it is around 28 percentage points. The largest safety net program, VGF, 
appears to have higher error rates compared to the PMT model in terms of covering the bottom 
20 percent of the population. It should be noted however, that the results of the PMTF is biased 
toward better targeting accuracy due to the following assumptions: (i) the outreach of 
beneficiaries is perfect; (ii) the up-take by beneficiaries is 100 percent; and (iii) there is perfect 
program implementation. Nevertheless, these comparisons, albeit imperfect, suggest replacing 
existing targeting mechanisms with a PMT model could potentially improve the  targeting 
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Source: HIES 2005 and simulations. 
 
What these results however are unable to show is the impact of a PMT based targeting scheme 
on the actual welfare of the eligible beneficiaries. This would require the identification of a 
payment schedule and a budget envelop that would allow for the share of the benefits to be the 
highest among the bottom 10 to 20 percent of the population. In the following we simulate the 
impact of various payment schedules using a number of feasible budget constraints on the 
national poverty rate and poverty gap, and compare the incidence of benefits.  
 
The total public spending on safety net programs by the Government of Bangladesh was less 
than 1 percent of GDP till the later 1990s, and has increased to 1.6 percent by 2007-2008 (World 
Bank, 2008). This would imply around Taka 98 billion was spent on safety nets in 2007-2008, 
which is fairly substantial when compared to social spending in other low-income countries. The 
Bangladesh Government anticipates expenditures on social welfare programs to be even higher 
in the coming years due to the need for both increased coverage as well as increased amount of 
benefit per capita (Ministry of Finance, 2008). Even if a third of the current safety net budget of 
around Taka 34 billion is spent in programs that use a PMT-based targeting mechanism to cover 
20-30 percent of the population, simulations show that under various payment schedules, there is 
the potential for a 7.5 percentage reduction in the poverty rate (representing a drop from 40 to 37 
percent) and a 22 percentage decrease in the poverty gap (representing a decrease from 9 to 7). 24 
 
Table 4 shows the coverage, undercoverage and leakage rates
11 associated with three types of 
payments schedule: (A) Taka 300 per household per month; (B) Taka 500 per household per 
month; and (C) Taka 710 per household per month.
12 We find that if the average amount of 
benefits is not increased and kept at the current average level of Taka 300 per household per 
month, it allows for a coverage of over 33 percent of the population. However, if the amount of 
benefit is increased to Taka 500 or Taka 710, even though a lower number of the population are 
covered, the leakage in the program decreases at the expense of leaving more numbers of poor 




Table 4. Coverage, undercoverage, leakage and benefit incidence using different payment 
options 











Leakage  Incidence of Benefits 
            Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5 
A  300  33.6  8.5  34.56  22.11  46.7  31.2  16.4  4.9  0.8 
B  500  20.2  4.9  56.29  13.32  56.2  30.5  10.3  2.6  0.5 
C  710  14.2  3.4  68.09  10.14  62.6  27.3  8.3  1.8  0.1 
D  710  28.8  7.3  41.75  19.38  49.5  31.1  14.8  3.9  0.7 
 
Table 4 presents a dilemma regarding which payment option to choose given that all three has 
similar impacts on the poverty rate and poverty gap. However, when we look at the incidence of 
benefits, we find it to be far more progressive for option C compared to option A. Thus, the 
results in Table 4 present a number of trade-offs between: (i) the level of benefits and coverage; 
(ii) undercoverage and leakage; (iii) coverage and benefit incidence. A reasonable payment 
option given a budget constraint of Taka 34 billion is option B which allows the coverage of the 
bottom 20 percent of the population with reasonable targeting accuracy and incidence of 
benefits. The results also suggest that large numbers of poor people live around the poverty line 
                                                 
11 The leakage rate is the same for in terms of beneficiaries as well as level of benefits since the levels of benefits are 
uniform and not progressive.  
12 These simulations were conducted using AdePT-Targeting, a STATA program developed by Michael Lokshin 
and Zurab Sajaia of the Development Research Group in the World Bank. Simulations using different progressive 
payment schedules were also conducted but are not reported since the impact on the poverty rate and poverty gap 
were not significantly different.  
13 Tk. 300 represents only 5 percent of the average per capita monthly household expenditure which is much lower 
when compared to other developing countries. Thus there is ample room to raise the benefit levels without having to 
worry about work disincentives. 25 
 
which is why the impact on poverty measures remains unaffected when we increase the level of 
benefits.  Further simulations suggest that if the total budget envelop is increased to Taka 68 
billion which is two-thirds of current expenditure on safety nets, a much higher impact on 
poverty can be achieved (see Option D in Table 4). With a benefit amount of Taka 710 per 
household per month reduces poverty rate from 40 to 33.4 percent (16.5 percent decrease) and 
poverty gap from 9 to 5.6 (37 percent decrease). This would cover around 7.3 million hosueholds 
and allow for a similar benefit incidence as found in Option A. Whichever payment option and 
budget envelop is chosen, these results in Table 4 show that in terms of benefits, a PMT-based 
targeting system will always allocate a higher share of the benefits to the poorest at the cost of 
losses incurred by the less poor sections of the population. The share of benefits for the bottom 
20 percent under the PMTF is much higher as shown in Table 4 – and conversely the share of the 
top quintile is much lower – than that under the existing targeting system employed by various 
programs (Table 2). However, it is important to note that simulations reported in Table 4 are 
rough calculations using a number of simplifying assumptions regarding perfect implementation 
and do not account for administrative and implementation costs.  
 
5.  PMTF Implementation Challenges 
 
Developing the PMTF is only one key aspect of a household targeting system. Ensuring that the 
PMTF is properly implemented is equally critical, especially if it is to serve multiple programs 
(with differing thresholds for eligibility) as in the case of Bangladesh. The administrative 
responsibilities that are associated with implementing a PMT based targeting system include: (a) 
a household interview and/or home visit to apply a short questionnaire to collect data on the 
PMTF;  (b) an automated information system for data entry, validation and processing a 




section briefly discusses these administrative requirements associated with a PMT-based 
household targeting system to identify the key implementation challenges in the context of the 
institutional setting in Bangladesh. 
                                                 
14 See Castaneda and Lindert (2005) for more details on cross-country experiences with implementing PMT-based 
household targeting systems.  26 
 
5.1  Data collection processes 
The process through which household information is collected is a crucial challenge that needs to 
be overcome to ensure successful targeting results. First, budgetary constraints may not allow 
programs to do a door-to-door collection of information from households, as is generally 
recommended when using a PMT-based targeting approach. A household visit makes it possible 
to verify the location and housing quality and other variables used in the PMTF. However, 
household visits are time consuming and costly, especially when the expected program coverage 
is large. An intermediate solution is to collect the information at program offices, and to make 
household visits for a sample of beneficiaries to verify the information collected.
15
 
  After 
verification, households that had given inaccurate information would then have to pay some sort 
of a penalty. To encourage households to report information accurately, the probability of being 
caught would have to be high and the penalty severe so that households are serious about 
voluntary compliance. A second challenge is that many extreme poor people may not actually 
come to program offices to apply given that these groups are most likely to be isolated and have 
less access to information in general.  This implies that an outreach effort will be needed to 
inform and encourage potential beneficiaries to apply. One option is to use community based 
organizations to get the information out regarding procedures for application and entry. A third 
challenge will be to have a continuous and an open registration system allowing households to 
apply at any time. This is particularly important in the context of Bangladesh where households 
face frequent shocks and the safety net system should be designed such that it is able to “catch 
them when they fall.” Such an on-demand registration system would require a permanent set of 
local welfare offices which would be in charge of ensuring a transparent, credible and quality 
data collection process.  
5.2  Management of household information registries 
Once household data is collected, they need to be entered into a database of a household 
information registry where each household has a single identification number under which to 
enter the household information. This is a major challenge in the case of Bangladesh since other 
                                                 
15 However, the costs savings of collecting information in this way would have to be weighed against the likely 




than the recently produced voter registration identification system no other forms of population-
wide identification currently exists. Countries with similar challenges have adopted a system 
whereby at the time of application, the household and its members receive a unique number. 
However, this means that a single database for beneficiary selection is maintained and managed 
so that duplication of information is avoided. There are a number of advantages to having a 
unified database.  This database could be shared with various central and local level agencies so 
that it may be used as a screening device for multiple programs and for cross-checking purposes. 
This would imply that there could be program-specific sub-sets of this single, unified database 
which would include information on households that have been deemed eligible for program 
benefits given program-specific eligibility thresholds. These program-specific beneficiary lists 
also help to monitor payments, support case management, screen for duplicate benefits (within or 
between beneficiary databases) and provide information for program financial and other 
statistical reports. The important thing is to ensure that both these two types of databases (unified 
or the master database and program-specific database) are updated simultaneously. This would 
require extensive coordination among the various ministries implementing various programs and 
thus could be a major challenge. One option to overcome this problem of coordination is to 
install a common software application so that there is compatibility of systems across ministries 
for uploading of data but assign a single institution within an appropriate ministry as the 
“keeper” of the database. Such data management systems will be especially important if data 
collection, entry and validation activities are decentralized.  
 
5.3  Institutional responsibility 
While decentralization of all activities is not essential for the success of a PMT-based household 
targeting system, having clear institutional roles as to who is responsible for the design of the 
system, data collection and database management is extremely important. Some of these key 
functions include the following: 
•  Develop the PMTF using nationally representative household surveys as well as the 
operational manual and procedures for data collection, entry and maintenance. Since the 
PMTF would have to be updated from time to time as new national level data becomes 
available, a central body that is proficient in the analysis of household surveys could be in 
charge of this activity.  28 
 
•  Collect household level information at the local level with the help of community 
organizations. Since using an on-demand approach to collect or register households 
seeking support would be important, this function is well-served if conducted by local 
level authorities such as at the municipality and upazila  level.  However, these data 
collection activities would have to be funded centrally. 
•  Enter household level data to build household database. This activity could de done 
centrally or locally and would depend on the capacity level at the local level.  
•  Manage unified and project-specific databases. Since the main database will have to be 
shared with multiple programs (and in the case of Bangladesh, with multiple ministries), 
it is best that it is managed centrally in one ministry while the program-specific databases 
are maintained by various ministries in charge of their respective programs.  
•  Carry out random-sample audits and quality control reviews to provide oversight of the 
data collection process at the local level. This activity is generally centrally managed and 
coordinated with authorities who are in a position to impose penalties in cases of fraud. 
 
5.4.  Monitoring, verification and fraud control 
Oversight functions are critical for the success of any targeting system, especially when major 
responsibilities are decentralized. Whilst creating a fool-proof system is extremely difficult, if 
not simply impossible, the goal should be to develop a feasible and cost-efficient system to 
minimize fraud to the extent possible. Some of the oversight instruments implemented in various 
countries range from having supervisors to oversee the data collection process to including the 
community members to monitor and handle appeals cases. Software applications used to develop 
and manage household databases can have built-in checks for consistency, duplication and 
missing information. Finally, as mentioned earlier, random sample re-interviews of households 
or “spot checks” can provide important feedback on the quality of the data collection process. 
Having a well-publicized oversight mechanism also helps to secure public confidence in the 
targeting system. Finally, having full transparency by making all information publicly accessible 
(such as the list of beneficiaries and financial reports) serves the dual purpose of providing the 
right incentives to program officials while securing public confidence in the system. 
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6.  Conclusion    
 
The effective implementation of any targeted safety net program requires the identification of 
both the needy and non-needy households, an exercise that is not easily accomplished. In 
developing a formula for proxy means testing, this paper presents an option to set up a household 
targeting system that is transparent, uses objective criteria and is administratively simple. The 
results presented in the paper indicate that despite the relatively high exclusion errors in some 
areas like the Dhaka division, the proposed model for establishing a PMTF for Bangladesh is 
highly progressive in its targeting performance and reasonable in its targeting accuracy. The 
results also highlight the sensitivity of the choice of the cut-off vis-à-vis the targeting 
performance of the model. They open up the possibility of using higher cut-off lines in areas 
where the model does not do as well such as in the Dhaka division. However, the choice of the 
cut-off line would also have to depend on the fiscal space available for implementing safety net 
programs. The overall results that a cut-off line of the 20
th percentile may be a reasonable choice 
that offers decent targeting accuracy without putting much of a strain on resources.  
 
The PMTF however has its limitations. First, the results presented in this paper suggest targeting 
the extreme poor in Bangladesh using a PMTF and a limited budget is a challenge. The errors are 
large, and quite disproportionate across divisions when we use lower cut-offs. Thus, additional 
strategies to minimize these errors such as involving communities in outreach activities could be 
explored when budgets are limited. Second, there could also be some systematic omissions of 
certain types of households due to the PMT formula itself. Some poor households might be 
missed, such as small households since household size has a large weight in the PMTF. For 
example, a household with two old persons living with a grandchild is less likely to be picked up 
by the formula. Third, the data used to develop the PMTF is from 2005 and some of the variables 
may have changed which may mean that their respective weights could have changed as well. 
Thus it would be prudent to validate the proposed PMT formula via a pilot to (i) ensure ways to 
cover poor households that are likely to fall through the cracks (small families for example); (ii) 
refine the formula based on the above findings and any other location-specific or information 
verification factors; (iii) understand the implications/lessons for field work or data collection 
efforts, specifically with regards to ensuring the accuracy of self-reported information; and 30 
 
finally (iv) ensure that that our analysis is consistent with current patterns of household 
consumption. 
 
There are other concerns with using a PMTF-based household targeting system that have policy 
and institutional implications. For instance the formula needs to be updated over time using 
household surveys, and thus policy makers would need to ensure that there is some level of 
consistency between the household surveys that are conducted over time. Having a robust PMT 
formula is a necessary but not a sufficient pre-condition to developing an effective household 
targeting system. Equally important is the institutional framework that will allow for: (i) a cost-
efficient data collection process through an appropriate outreach campaign; (ii) effective 
management of information or a database that is up-dated in regular intervals; and (iii) a feasible 
and cost-efficient monitoring and verification system to minimize fraud and leakage.    
 
Notwithstanding these caveats, the analysis presented in this paper suggests that the proposed 
PMTF is able to improve the targeting efficiency a considerable amount when compared to 
existing targeted social assistance programs. The results suggest delivering as little as a third of 
the current safety net budget via a PMT-based targeting system results in a 7.5 percentage drop 
in the poverty rate, and a 22 percentage drop in the poverty gap. Another merit of using the 
PMT-based targeting system is perhaps one regarding implementation where once the system is 
put in place, government safety net programs can be easily scaled up to cover larger numbers of 
poor households over a shorter period of time. Being in such a position is especially attractive for 
any government in the event of crises situations such as those associated with food, fuel and 
finance in recent times. Generally means tests used by the large cash transfer programs in 
Bangladesh (e.g. IGVGD, Primary Education Stipend Program, Road Maintenance Program) 
already gather some information on household characteristics in addition to income (e.g. land 
ownership, female-headed households, occupation, family size, etc.). By using PMT based 
targeting a more systematic use of that information could potentially improve current targeting 
outcomes as well as the fairness and transparency in the allocation of resources to the poor by 
these programs.  
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8.  Annex 
 
Table A1: Illustration of type I error and type II errors.  
  Target Group: (actual 






welfare ≤cut-off line) 
Targeting Success  
(S1) 








Targeting Success (S2)   M2 
Total   N1  N2  N 
A person who is incorrectly excluded by the PMT formula is a case of an exclusion error and conversely, a person who is incorrectly included by 
the formula is a case of inclusion error. Given these exclusion and inclusion errors, under-coverage is calculated by dividing the number of cases 
of exclusion errors by the total number of individuals who should get benefits or the target group [E1/N1] and leakage is calculated by dividing the 
number of inclusion errors by the number of persons that are determined eligible by the formula (E2/M1). The coverage rate is the sum of total 
beneficiaries as a proportion of the total population (M1/N). 
Source: Huo, 2008 
 
Table A2. Targeting errors by different national and sectoral models 
Model  Adj 
R2 
15th percentile  20th percentile  25th percentile  30th percentile  40th percentile 
     cov  under
cov 
leak  cov  underc
ov 
leak  cov  underc
ov 
leak  cov  underc
ov 
leak  cov  underc
ov 
leak 
PMT  0.57  0.084  0.685  0.4  0.141  0.573  0.397  0.19  0.492  0.333  0.246  0.427  0.302  0.357  0.315  0.233 
A  0.64  0.173  0.473  0.543  0.236  0.401  0.494  0.288  0.337  0.427  0.345  0.28  0.374  0.444  0.217  0.295 
B  0.52  0.069  0.733  0.42  0.129  0.601  0.384  0.175  0.524  0.322  0.228  0.454  0.282  0.338  0.344  0.225 
C  0.66  0.172  0.466  0.536  0.235  0.399  0.489  0.297  0.314  0.423  0.352  0.265  0.374  0.46  0.199  0.305 
D  0.54  0.68  0.724  0.4  0.127  0.597  0.368  0.175  0.517  0.313  0.227  0.449  0.275  0.346  0.331  0.228   34 
Table A3. Regression results  
             
 
Proposed PMT Model  
Dhaka                -0.101 
                (6.53)** 
Barisal               -0.306 
                (15.15)** 
Chittagong              -0.119 
                (7.46)** 
Khulna               -0.260 
                (14.74)** 
Rajshahi              -0.256 
                (15.80)** 
Access to foreign remittances          0.126 
                (10.38)** 
Household size of 2, omitted 
Household size of 3            -0.132 
                (5.76)** 
Household size of 4            -0.199 
                (8.67)** 
Household size of 5            -0.256 
                (10.77)** 
Household size of 6            -0.293 
                (11.79)** 
Household size of 7            -0.317 
                (12.08)** 
Household size of 8 or more          -0.356 
                (13.34)** 
No. of children aged 0 to 15 years: 0, omitted 
No. of children aged 0 to 15 years: 1        -0.094 
                (7.25)** 
No. of children aged 0 to 15 years: 2        -0.161 
                (11.85)** 
No. of children aged 0 to 15 years: 3        -0.171 
                (11.10)** 
No. of children aged 0 to 15 years: 4 or more      -0.234 
                (13.52)** 
Education of spouse: none, omitted 
Education of spouse: less than 5 years        0.005 
                (0.42) 
Education of spouse: 5 to 9 years         0.029 
                (2.49)* 
Education of spouse: 10 years or more        0.147 
                (11.13)** 
Age of household head: less than 30 or more than 50 yrs, omitted 
Age of household head: 30 to 50 yrs         0.049 
                (6.99)** 
Education of household head: none, omitted 
Education of household head: less than 5 years      0.071 
                (6.25)** 
Education of household head: 5 to 9 years      0.124   35 
                (10.83)** 
Education of household head: 10 years or more      0.188 
                (13.24)** 
1, if hh member engaged as agricultural labourer     -0.088 
                (9.15)** 
1, if hh member engaged as non-agricultural labourer    -0.054 
                (5.91)** 
1, if no spouse; separated or divorced        -0.178 
                (9.50)** 
Amount of land owned: none, omitted 
1, if amt of land owned is between 0 to 1.5 acres     0.054 
                (6.53)** 
1, if amt of land owned is more than 1.5 acres      0.226 
                (19.98)** 
1, if hh owns a fan            0.069 
                (5.70)** 
1, if hh owns a TV            0.119 
                (11.89)** 
1, if hh owns cattle            0.029 
                (3.64)** 
1, if hh owns a bicycle            0.032 
                (3.60)** 
1, if hh owns a drinking tube well        0.077 
                (9.23)** 
No. of members per room          -0.041 
                (14.04)** 
1, if hh has no electricity          -0.023 
                (2.10)* 
1, if hh owns house            0.041 
                (3.59)** 
1, if hh has cement roof, omitted 
1, if hh has tin roof            -0.284 
                (18.00)** 
1, if hh has wood roof            -0.362 
                (12.06)** 
1, if hh has straw roof            -0.308 
                (14.90)** 
1, if hh has no latrine, omitted 
1, if hh has sanitary latrine          0.109 
                (7.52)** 
1, if hh has kacha permanent latrine        0.063 
                (4.42)** 
1, if hh has kacha temporary latrine        0.063 
                (4.49)** 
1, if hh was brick wall, omitted 
1, if hh has mud wall             -0.131 
                (9.41)** 
1, if hh has tin wall            -0.106 
                (8.79)** 
1, if hh has straw wall            -0.161 
                (11.96)**   36 
Constant              7.557 
                (230.49)** 
 
Observations        10078 
R-squared        0.57 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses       
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     37 
 
Table 4A. Weights on each variable                 
Variables      Dummy Weights   Variables    Dummy   Weights 
Location              Household assets           
  Sylhet      *   0     Own tube well     *   8 
  Dhaka      *  - 10     Own house    *   4 
  Barisal      *  - 31     Own fan      *   7 
  Chittagong      *  - 12     Own TV      *   12 
  Khulna      *  - 26     Own cattle    *   3 
  Rajshahi      *  - 26     Own bicycle    *   3 
Household characteristics            Own land:      
  household size =2    *   0       none    *   0 
  household size =3    *  - 13      
>0; < 1.5 
acres    *   5 
  household size =4    *  - 20      > 1.5 acres    *   23 
  household size =5    *  - 26   Housing     *    
  household size =6    *  - 29    
No. of members per 
room    *  - 4 
  Household size=7    *  - 32     Roof: cement    *   0 
  Household size=>8    *  - 36     Roof: wood    *  - 36 
 
No. of children 
(0<yr<15)=0  *   0     Roof: tin    *  - 28 
 
No. of children 
(0<yr<15)=1  *  - 7    
Roof: straw, bamboo, 
other    *  - 31 
 
No. of children 
(0<yr<15)=2  *  - 10     Wall: brick    *   0 
 
No. of children 
(0<yr<15)=3  *  - 11     Wall: mud    *  - 13 
 
No. of children 
(0<yr<15)=>4  *  - 16     Wall: tin    *  - 10 
  Spouse educ: none  *   0    
Wall: straw, bamboo, 
other    *  - 16 
 
Spouse educ: below 5 
yrs    *   0   Access to facilities & remittances        
  Spouse educ: 5 to 9 yrs    *   3     No electricity    *  - 2 
 
Spouse educ: more than 
10 yrs    *   15     No latrine    *   0 
 
HH member work: agri 
labourer    *  - 9     Kacha permanent latrine    *   6 
 
HH member work: non-
agri labourer    *  - 5      Kacha temporary latrine    *   6 
 
No spouse; 
separated;widowed    *  - 18      Sanitary latrine    *   11 
Household head characteristics             
Household receives foreign 
remittances  *    13 
  Age: <=30 yrs; >=50 yrs  *   0                
  Age: 30<yrs<50    *   5                
  Educ: none    *   0               
  Educ: below 5 yrs    *   7            
  Educ: 5 to 9 yrs    *   12              
  Educ: more than 10 yrs  *   19   Constant          757   38 
Table 4B Computation of Household PMT Score 
Variable   Weight  Household A  PMT score of A  Household B  PMT score of B 
Sylhet  0  0  0  0  0 
Dhaka  -10  0  0  1  -10 
Barisal  -31  1  -31  0  0 
Chittagong  -12  0  0  0  0 
Khulna  -26  0  0  0  0 
Rajshahi  -26  0  0  0  0 
household size =2  0  0  0  0  0 
household size =3  -13  0  0  0  0 
household size =4  -20  0  0  1  -20 
household size =5  -26  1  -26  0  0 
household size =6  -29  0  0  0  0 
household size =7  -32         
household size >=8  -36         
No. of children (0<yr<15)=0  0         
No. of children (0<yr<15)=1  -9  0  0  0  0 
No. of children (0<yr<15)=2  -16  0  0  1  -16 
No. of children (0<yr<15)=3  -17  1  -17  0  0 
No. of children (0<yr<15)=4  -23  0  0  0  0 
Spouse educ:none  0  1  0  0  0 
Spouse educ: below 5   0  0  0  1  -3 
Spouse educ: 5 to 9 yrs  3  0  0  0  0 
Spouse educ: > 10 yrs  15         
HH head age: <=40 yrs; >=60 yrs  0  0  0  0  0 
HH head age: 40<yrs<60  5  1  5  1  5 
HH head educ: none  0  1  0  0  0 
HH head Educ: below 5 yrs  7  0  0  1  7 
HH head Educ: 5 to 9 yrs  12  0  0  0  0 
HH head educ: > 10 yrs  19  0  0  1  19 
HH member work: agri labourer  -9  1  -9  0  0 
HH member  work: non-agri labourer  -5  0  0  0  0 
No spouse; separated;widowed  -18  0  0  0  0 
Own tube well   8  0  0  1  8 
Own house  4  0  0  1  4 
Own fan  7  0  0  1  7 
Own TV  12  0  0  0  0 
Own cattle  3  0  0  0  0 
Own bicycle  3  0  0  0  0 
Own land: none  0  1  0  0  0 
Own land: >0; < 1.5 acres  5  0  0  1  5 
Own land: > 1.5 acres  23  0  0  0  0 
No. of members per room  -4  5  -20  4  -16 
Roof: cement  0  0  0  0  0 
Roof: wood  -36         
Roof: tin  -28  1  -28  1  -28 
Roof: straw, bamboo, tile, other  -31  0  0  0  0 
Wall: brick  0  0  0  0  0 
Wall: mud  -13  1  -13  0  0 
Wall: tin  -11  0  0  1  -11 
Wall: straw, bamboo, other  -16  0  0  0  6 
No electricity  -2  1  -2  0  0 
No latrine  0  0  0  0  0 
Kacha permanent latrine  6  0  0  1  6 
Kacha temporary latrine  6  1  6  0  0 
Sanitary latrine  11  0  0  0  0 
Household receives foreign remittances  13  0  0  1  13 
Constant  757         
PMTF score      622    733 
Cut-off percentile  15  20  25  30  40 
Cut-off score  659  663  664  670  676 
*At any of the above cut-offs, household A is eligible while household B is ineligible.   39 
Table A5. Comparisons of variables included in PMT models in South Asia 
 
Variable   Sri Lanka  Pakistan  Bangladesh 
Location       
Rural/urban/estate sectors  X     
Divisions      X 
       
Community characteristics  X     
       
Access to foreign remittances      X 
       
Household Assets       
Tube well       X 
Fan  X    X 
TV  X  X  X 
Cattle/livestock  X  X  X 
Bicycle  X    X 
Car/van  X     
Cooker  X     
Refrigerator  X  X   
Motorcycle/scooter  X  X   
Radio/CD or cassette player  X     
Sewing machine  X     
tractor  X  X   
phone    X   
Watch    X   
Airconditioner    X   
Computer    X   
       
Land ownership/lease/rent  X  X  X 
       
Household head       
age  X  X  X 
education  X  X  X 
occupation  X  X  X 
Marriage status  X  X  X 
gender  X  X  X 
       
Household demographics       
Household size  X  X  X 
Member age  X  X  X 
       
Housing characteristics       
Own house  X  X  X 
No. of rooms per member  X  X  X 
Type of wall  X  X  X 
Type of roof    X  X 
Type of latrine  X  X  X 
Fuel for cooking  X  X   
electricity  X  X  X 
   40 
Figure A1. Comparing targeting accuracy of separate models for urban areas  
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Figure A2. Comparing targeting accuracy of separate models for rural areas 
 
undercoverage           leakage 
 
    

























PMT model Model B Model D
           

























PMT model Model B Model D
 
•  Model A – PMT model conditioned in urban areas 
•  Model B – PMT model conditioned in rural areas 
•  Model C – stepwise regression for all possible variables to predict urban welfare 
•  Model D – stepwise regression for all possible variables to predict rural welfare   41 
Table A6. Robustness check                     
Model  Adj 
R2 
15th percentile  20th percentile  25th percentile  30th percentile  40th percentile 
    cov  under 
cov 
leak  cov  under 
cov 
leak  cov  under
cov 
leak  cov  under 
cov 
leak  cov  under
cov 
leak 
PMT model  0.57  0.084  0.685  0.4  0.141  0.573  0.397  0.19  0.492  0.333  0.246  0.427  0.302  0.357  0.315  0.233 
PMT model 
using sample  0.57  0.085  0.684  0.435  0.14  0.578  0.381  0.19  0.498  0.321  0.245  0.435  0.3  0.364  0.312  0.225 
 
 
Table A7. Error rates by division and urban/rural areas     
Division  15th percentile  20th percentile  25th percentile  30th percentile  40th percentile 
  cov  undercov  leak  cov  undercov  leak  cov  undercov  leak  cov  undercov  leak  cov  undercov  leak 
Barisal  0.157  0.672  0.415  0.241  0.540  0.392  0.304  0.481  0.370  0.386  0.398  0.335  0.510  0.281  0.267 
Chittagong  0.060  0.653  0.465  0.100  0.556  0.422  0.155  0.478  0.400  0.216  0.413  0.366  0.331  0.326  0.310 
Dhaka  0.034  0.827  0.439  0.066  0.748  0.420  0.095  0.684  0.364  0.132  0.620  0.333  0.225  0.460  0.233 
Khulna  0.126  0.646  0.486  0.205  0.506  0.390  0.256  0.411  0.299  0.304  0.357  0.258  0.437  0.278  0.244 
Rajshahi  0.145  0.577  0.416  0.230  0.465  0.383  0.294  0.388  0.298  0.368  0.313  0.261  0.488  0.213  0.175 
Sylhet  0.027  0.894  0.514  0.090  0.687  0.397  0.149  0.510  0.312  0.201  0.470  0.328  0.304  0.321  0.247 
                               
Urban areas  0.037  0.732  0.225  0.066  0.666  0.270  0.092  0.611  0.242  0.120  0.562  0.220  0.188  0.457  0.179 
Rural areas  0.100  0.674  0.466  0.166  0.552  0.413  0.222  0.466  0.345  0.287  0.398  0.313  0.413  0.285  0.241 
                               
Dhaka urban  .0.009  0.863  0.153  0.025  0.837  0.404  0.036  0.794  0.368  0.051  0.757  0.334  0.091  0.644  0.209 
Dhaka rural  0.050  0.819  0.471  0.091  0.724  0.422  0.131  0.653  0.363  0.181  0.581  0.333  0.305  0.403  0.231 
ROC – urban  0.063  0.687  0.235  0.106  0.591  0.240  0.144  0.530  0.212  0.186  0.471  0.190  0.279  0.357  0.170 
ROC – rural   0.118  0.629  0.465  0.193  0.50  0.411  0.257  0.409  0.342  0.326  0.342  0.309  0.452  0.248  0.242 
                               
Dhaka  0.034  0.827  0.439  0.066  0.748  0.420  0.095  0.684  0.364  0.132  0.620  0.333  0.225  0.460  0.233 
ROC  0.105  0.655  0.451  0.171  0.525  0.384  0.23  0.452  0.338  0.286  0.384  0.286  0.415  0.268  0.227 
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Table A8. Coverage by per capita consumption deciles: 20
th percentile cut-off 
Decile  National  Urban areas  Rural areas  Dhaka 
         
1  0.52  0.51  0.53  0.29 
2  0.31  0.18  0.37  0.18 
3  0.23  0.14  0.27  0.10 
4  0.13  0.08  0.15  0.08 
5  0.06  0.02  0.08  0.06 
6  0.05  0.01  0.06  0.01 
7  0.02  0.00  0.03  0.01 
8  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
9  0.004  0.00  0.01  0.01 
10  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Total  0.135  0.08  0.164  0.06 
 
 
Figure A3. Incidence of targeting by per capita consumption decile (cut-off =20
th percentile) 
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Table A9. Distribution of Inclusion and Exclusion errors: 20
th percentile cut-off 
 
Decile  National  Urban areas  Rural areas  Dhaka 
               
1  42.48    40.81    43.41    46.31   
2  57.52    59.19    56.59    53.69   
3    43.11    46.27    42.56    28.13 
4    27.33    32.84    26.37    37.50 
5    14.89    17.91    14.36    20.31 
6    9.11    2.99    10.18    7.81 
7    3.78        4.44    4.69 
8    1.33        1.57    1.56 
9    0.44        0.52     
10                 




Figure A4. Distribution of Exclusion and Inclusion errors (using a 20
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